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Abstrat
We have studied a spatially extended snowdrift game, in whih the players are loated on the sites
of two-dimensional square latties and repeatedly have to hoose one of the two strategies, either
ooperation (C) or defetion (D). A player interats with its nearest neighbors only, and aims at
playing a strategy whih maximizes its instant pay-o, assuming that the neighboring agents retain
their strategies. If a player is not ontent with its urrent strategy, it will hange it to the opposite
one with probability p next round. Here we show through simulations and analytial approah that
these rules result in ooperation levels, whih dier to large extent from those obtained using the
repliator dynamis.
INTRODUCTION
Understanding the emergene and persis-
tene of ooperation is one of the entral
problems in evolutionary biology and soioe-
onomis [1, 2℄. In investigating this prob-
lem the standard framework utilized is evolu-
tionary game theory [2, 3, 4℄. Espeially two
models, the Prisoner's Dilemma [5, 6, 7℄ and
its variation, the snowdrift game [3, 8℄, have
attrated most attention. In both games,
the players an either ooperate for ommon
good, or defet and exploit other players in
attempt to gain benets individually. In the
Prisoner's Dilemma, the preondition is that
it pays o to be non-ooperative. Beause
of this, defetion is the only evolutionarily
stable strategy (ESS) in populations whih
are fully mixed, i.e. where eah player in-
terats with any other player [9℄. However,
several models whih are extensions of the
Prisoner's Dilemma have proved to sustain
ooperation. These models inlude those in
whih the players are assumed to have mem-
ory of the previous interations [10℄, or har-
ateristis that allow ooperators and defe-
tors to distinguish eah other [11℄, or players
are spatially distributed [12, 13, 14℄.
A typial spatial game is suh where
player-player interations only take plae
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within restrited neighborhoods on regular
latties [14, 15, 16, 17℄ or on omplex net-
works [18℄. These games have been found
to generate highly omplex behavior and en-
able the persistene of ooperation. Regard-
ing the latter, the opposite was reently seen
in the ase of the snowdrift game played on a
two-dimensional lattie [12℄, where the spa-
tial struture resulted in dereased ooper-
ator densities ompared to the fully mixed
mean-eld ase. This result was surpris-
ing, as intermediate levels of ooperation per-
sist in unstrutured snowdrift games, and the
ommon belief has been that spatial stru-
ture is usually beneial for sustained levels
of ooperation.
In these studies the viewpoint has largely
been that of biologial evolution, as repre-
sented by the so-alled repliator dynamis
[4, 19, 20℄, where the fration of players
who use high-payo-strategies grow (stohas-
tially) in the population proportionally to
the payos. This mehanism an be viewed
as depiting Darwinian evolution, where the
ttest have the largest hane of survival and
reprodution. Overall, the fators inuen-
ing the outomes of these spatially strutured
games are (i) the rules determining the pay-
os (e.g. Ref. [21℄), (ii) the topology of the
spatial struture (e.g. Ref. [17℄), and (iii)
the rules determining the evolution of eah
player's strategy (e.g. Ref. [22, 23℄). We have
studied the eet of hanging the strategy
evolution rules (iii) in the two-dimensional
snowdrift game similar to that disussed in
Ref. [12℄. In our version, the rules have
been dened in suh a way that hanges in
the players' strategies represent player dei-
sions instead of dierent strategy genotypes
in the next evolutionary generation of play-
ers. Thus, the time sale of the popula-
tion dynamis in our model an be viewed
to be muh shorter than evolutionary time
sales. Instead of utilizing the evolution-
inspired repliator dynamis, we have en-
dowed the players with primitive intelli-
gene in the form of loal deision-making
rules determining their strategies. We show
with simulations and analyti approah that
these rules result in ooperation levels whih
dier largely from those obtained using the
repliator dynamis.
In this study we will onentrate on an
adaptive snowdrift game, with agents inter-
ating with their nearest neighbor agents on
a two-dimensional square lattie. In what
follows we rst desribe our spatial snow-
drift model and then analyze its equilibrium
states. Next we present our simulation re-
sults and nally draw some onlusions.
2
SPATIAL SNOWDRIFT MODEL
The snowdrift model[27℄ an be illustrated
with a situation in whih two ars are aught
in a blizzard and there is a snowdrift bloking
their way. The ars are equipped with shov-
els, and the drivers have two hoies: either
start shoveling the road open or remain in the
ar. If the road is leared, both drivers gain
the benet b of getting home. On the other
hand, learing the road requires some work,
and ost c an be assigned to it (b > c > 0).
If both drivers are ooperative and willing
to shovel, this workload is shared between
them, and both of them gain total benet of
R = c− b/2. If both hoose to defet, i.e. re-
main in their ars, neither one gets home and
thus both obtain zero benet P = 0. If only
one of the drivers shovels, both get home, but
the defetor avoids the ost and gains bene-
t T = b, whereas the ooperator's benet is
redued by the workload, i.e. S = b− c.
The above desribed situation an be pre-
sented with the bi-matrix [24℄ (Table I),
where
T > R > S > P. (1)
In ase of the so alled one-shot game, eah
player has two available strategies, namely
defet (D) or ooperate (C). The players
hoose their strategies simultaneously, and
their individual payos are given by the ap-
propriate ell of the bi-matrix. By onven-
Table I: Snowdrift game. Player 1 hooses an
ation from the rows and player 2 from the
olumns. By onvention, the payo to the row
player is the rst payo given, followed by the
payo of the olumn player.
D C
D P, P T, S
C S, T R, R
tion, the payo to the so-alled row player is
the rst payo given, followed by the payo
of the olumn player. Thus, if for example
player 1 hooses D and player 2 hooses C,
then player 1 reeives the payo T and player
2 the payo S.
The best ation depends on the ation of
the o-player suh that defet if the other
player ooperates and ooperate if the other
defets. A simple analysis shows that the
game does not have stable evolutionary strat-
egy [19℄, if the agents use only pure strategies,
i.e., they an hoose either to ooperate or
to defet with probability one, but they are
not allowed to use a strategy whih mixes ei-
ther of these ations with some probability
q ∈ (0, 1). This leads to stable existene of
ooperators and defetors in well-mixed pop-
ulations [12℄.
In order to study the eet of spatial stru-
ture on the snowdrift game, we set the players
on a regular two-dimensional square lattie
onsisting of m ells. We adopt the nota-
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tion of Ref. ([25℄) and identify eah ell by
an index i = 1, . . . , m whih also refers to
its spatial position. Eah ell, representing
a player, is haraterized by its strategy si,
whih an be either to ooperate (si = 1) or
to defet (si = 0). The spatio-temporal dis-
tribution of the players is then desribed by
S = (s1, . . . , sm) whih is an element of a 2
m
dimensional hyperube. Then every player 
heneforth alled an agent  interats with
their n nearest neighbors. We use either the
Moore neighborhood in whih ase eah agent
has n = 8 neighbors, in N,NE,E,SE,S,SW,W
and NW, or the von Neumann neighborhood
in whih ase eah agent has n = 4 neighbors,
in N,E,S and W ompass diretions [26℄. We
require that an agent plays simultaneously
with all its n neighbors, and dene the pay-
os for this (n+ 1)− player game suh that
an agent i who interats with nic ooperators
and nid defetors, n
i
c+n
i
d = n, gains a benet
of
ui(si = 0) = n
i
cT + n
i
dP (2)
ui(si = 1) = n
i
cR + n
i
dS, (3)
from defeting or ooperating, respetively.
For determining their strategies, the
agents are endowed with primitive deision-
making apabilities. The agents retain no
memory of the past, and are not able to
predit how the strategies of the neighbor-
ing agents will hange. Every agent simply
assumes that the strategies of other agents
within its neighborhood remain xed, and
hooses an ation that maximizes its own
payo. In this sense the agents are myopi.
The payo is maximized, if an agent (a) de-
fets when ui(0) > ui(1), and (b) ooperates
when ui(1) > ui(0). If () ui(0) = ui(1) the
situation is indierent. Using Eqs. (2) and
(3) we an onnet the preferable hoie of
an agent and the payos of the game. Let us
denote
1
r
= 1 +
S − P
T −R
. (4)
Then, if
nic
n
> 1− r defeting is protable, or if (5)
nic
n
< 1− r ooperating is protable, or if(6)
nic
n
= 1− r hoies are indierent. (7)
Thus, for eah individual agent, the ratio
r determines a following deision-boundary
θ = n(1− r), (8)
whih depends on the neighborhood size n
and the temptation parameter r. Beause
r is determined only by the dierenes T −R
and S−P , we an x two of the payo values,
say R = 1 and P = 0. Based on the above,
we dene the following rules for the agents:
1. If an agent i plays at time t a strategy
si(t) ∈ {0, 1} for whih ui(si) ≥ ui(1 −
si), then at time t + 1 the agent plays
si(t+ 1) = si(t).
2. If an agent i plays at time t a strategy
si(t) ∈ {0, 1} for whih ui(si) < ui(1 −
si), then at time t + 1 the agent plays
si(t+ 1) = 1− si(t) with probability p,
and si(t + 1) = si(t) with probability
1− p.
Hene, the strategy evolution of an individual
agent is determined by the urrent strategies
of the other agents within its neighborhood,
with the parameter p ating as a regulator
whih moderates the rate of hanges.
EQUILIBRIUM STATES
A spatial game is in stable state or equi-
librium if retaining the urrent strategy is
beneial for all the agents [4℄. There an
be numerous equilibrium ongurations, de-
pending on the temptation parameter r, ge-
ometry and size of the n-neighborhood, and
the size and boundary onditions of the lat-
tie upon whih the game is played. An ag-
gregate quantity of partiular interest is the
fration of ooperators Fc in the whole popu-
lation (or, equivalently, that of the defetors
Fd). Below, we derive limits for Fc, rst in a
mean-eld piture based ooperator densi-
ties within neighborhoods and then by inves-
tigating loal neighborhood ongurations.
Mean-eld limits for ooperator density
Without detailed knowledge of loal equi-
librium ongurations we an already derive
some limits for the fration of ooperators in
equilibrium. Let us onsider a square lattie
with m = L × L ells with periodi bound-
ary onditions, where L is the linear size of
the lattie, and assume that k ells are o-
upied by ooperators. We denote by aj the
number of those agents who have j oopera-
tors eah in their n-neighborhood, exluding
the agents themselves, and denote the loal
density of ooperators in suh neighborhoods
by fc = j/n. Hene, the total amount of o-
operators k an be written in terms of the
densities as follows
k =
n∑
j=0
ajfc =
n∑
j=0
aj
j
n
. (9)
From Eqs. (5)-(7) we an infer that a
ooperator will retain its urrent strategy,
if it has at most c ooperators in its n-
neighborhood, where c is the integer part of
θ = n(1−r). Similarly, a defetor will remain
a defetor if it has more than c ooperators
in its neighborhood. Thus, in equilibrium,
all agents having j ≤ c ooperators in their
neighborhood are likewise ooperators, and
thus
∑c
j=0 aj = k. We denote by
〈
fc|c
〉
=
5
01
1−r
1−r 1
c|c
c|d
k<f   > + (m−k)<f   >c|c
<f   >
<f   >
c|d
Figure 1: In equilibrium the average density of
ooperators in the nearest neighborhood of defe-
tors must be 1−r ≤
〈
fc|d
〉
≤ 1 and in the nearest
neighborhood of ooperators 0 ≤
〈
fc|c
〉
≤ 1 − r
(shaded area). If the total number of players
in the lattie is m, the lines k
〈
fc|c
〉
+ (m −
k)
〈
fc|d
〉
= k depit the identity of k oopera-
tors in the lattie. Equilibrium is not possible,
if the fration of ooperators Fc = k/m is suh
that the lines do not pass through the shaded
area.
1
k
∑c
j=0 aj
j
n
the average density of oopera-
tors as the nearest neighbors of ooperators.
Similarly,
〈
fc|d
〉
denotes the average density
of ooperators as the nearest neighbors of de-
fetors, i.e.
〈
fc|d
〉
= 1
m−k
∑n
j=c+1 aj
j
n
. Then
we an write Eq. (9) as
k = k
〈
fc|c
〉
+ (m− k)
〈
fc|d
〉
. (10)
The density fc|c of ooperators around
eah ooperator is bounded: fc|c ≥ 0, fc|c ≤
c/n, and as c ≤ θ = n(1 − r), the relation
0 ≤
〈
fc|c
〉
≤ 1 − r holds for the average
density. Similarly, the density of ooperators
around eah defetor fc|d an be at most 1
and is at least (1 − r), and thus the average
density 1 − r ≤
〈
fc|d
〉
≤ 1. Using these re-
lations together with Eq. (10) we obtain the
following limits for the density of ooperators
Fc = k/m in the whole agent population (see
also Fig. 1):
1− r
2− r
≤ Fc ≤
1
r + 1
. (11)
Loal equilibrium ongurations
In the above derivation we ignore how the
strategies an atually be distributed in the
lattie. Hene, it is of interest to examine
possible loal equilibrium ongurations of
the player strategies. Again, Eqs. (5)-(7) tell
us how many ooperative neighbors eah de-
fetor or ooperator an have in the equi-
librium state. The number of ooperators
around eah agent depends on the value of
the temptation parameter r, and for a given
value of r the lattie has to be lled suh that
these onditions hold for the neighborhood of
eah agent. In a lattie with periodi bound-
ary onditions, the lattie size m = LX ×LY
and the neighborhood size n obviously have
an eet on the elementary ongurations.
Hene, we restrit ourselves to innite-sized
latties, lled by repeating elementary ong-
uration bloks, and look for the resulting lim-
its on the ooperator density Fc. Note that
these onlusions also hold for nite latties
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Table II: Limits for the equilibrium fration of
ooperators based on repeating elementary on-
guration bloks. When rl < r < ru, the number
of ooperators in eah defetor's neighborhood
Nc|d must be at least 9 − i and the number of
ooperators in eah ooperator's neighborhood
Nc|c at most 8− i. Considering possible repeat-
ing onguration bloks whih fulll these on-
ditions, we obtain lower limits Fc,L and upper
limits Fc,U for the density of ooperators.
i rl ru Nc|d ≥ Nc|c ≤ Fc,L Fc,U
1 0 1/8 8 7 3/4 8/9
2 1/8 2/8 7 6 2/3 4/5
3 2/8 3/8 6 5 1/2 2/3
4 3/8 4/8 5 4 1/2 2/3
5 4/8 5/8 4 3 4/9 1/2
6 5/8 6/8 3 2 1/3 1/2
7 6/8 7/8 2 1 2/9 1/3
8 7/8 8/8 1 0 1/9 1/4
with periodi boundary onditions, if LX and
LY are integer multiples of X and Y , respe-
tively, where X × Y is the elementary blok
size. Here, we will restrit the analysis to the
ase of the Moore neighborhood with n = 8.
As an example, onsider the loal ong-
urations when r = 0.1, and hene the de-
ision boundary value θ = n(1 − r) = 7.2.
Thus, from Eqs. (5)-(7) one an infer that
in equilibrium all defetors should have more
than 7.2 ooperators in their Moore neighbor-
hoods. Beause the number of ooperating
neighbors an take only integer values, this
means that every one of the n = 8 neighbors
of a defetor should be a ooperator. On the
X
X X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X X
XX
X
X
X
X X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X X
X
X
X X X
X
XX
X
X
1 2
3 4 5
6 7 8
Figure 2: Examples of elementary onguration
bloks whih an be repeated without overlap to
ll an innite lattie, for various values of r. The
numbering refers to i in Table II. A blak ell
denotes a defetor while an empty ell denotes
a ooperator. For a partiular number the lower
limit of density is obtained by lling the lattie
with the bloks on the left, and the upper by
using the bloks on the right.
other hand, from Eqs. (5)-(7) we see that the
density fc|c of ooperators around eah oop-
erator should be less than 1 − r, i.e. they
should have at most c = 7 ooperators in
their Moore neighborhood. The smallest re-
peated elementary blok fullling both on-
ditions is a 2 × 2-square with one defetor 
when the lattie is lled with these bloks,
the ooperator density equals Fc = 3/4 (see
Fig. (2), ase 1, left blok). On the other
hand, both requirements are likewise fullled
with a repeated 3× 3-square, where the en-
tral ell is a defetor and the rest are ooper-
ators, resulting in the ooperator density of
Fc = 8/9. This onguration is illustrated in
Fig. (2), as ase 1, right blok.
By ontinuing the analysis of elementary
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onguration bloks in similar fashion for dif-
ferent values of r, we obtain lower and upper
limits for the fration of ooperators, whih
are listed in Table II. The orresponding ele-
mentary onguration bloks are depited in
Fig. (2). The table is read so that when the
value of the temptation parameter is within
the interval rl < r < ru, the number of oop-
erators in eah defetor's neighborhood Nc|d
must be at least 9− i and the number of o-
operators in eah ooperator's neighborhood
Nc|c an be at most 8− i. Here rl = (i−1)/8,
ru = i/8 and i = 1, . . . , 8 These onditions
are those of Eqs. (5)-(7) and they are ful-
lled by the onguration bloks depited in
Fig. (2), for whih the minimum and max-
imum densities of ooperators are Fc,L and
Fc,U .
SIMULATION RESULTS
We have studied the above desribed spa-
tial snowdrift model with disrete time-step
simulations on a m = 100 × 100-lattie
with periodi boundary onditions. We have
speially analyzed the behavior of the o-
operator density Fc, and equilibrium lattie
ongurations. In the simulations, the lat-
tie is initialized randomly so that eah ell
ontains a ooperator or defetor with equal
probability. However, biasing the initial den-
sities toward ooperators or defetors was
found to have no onsiderable eet on the
outome of the game. We have simulated the
game using both the Moore and the von Neu-
mann neighborhoods with n = 8 and n = 4
nearest neighbors, respetively. In the sim-
ulations we update strategies of the agents
asynhronously [26℄ with the random sequen-
tial update sheme, so that during one simu-
lation round, every agent's strategies are up-
dated in random order. In the following, the
time sale is dened in terms of these simu-
lation rounds.
First, we have studied the development of
the ooperator density Fc as a funtion of
time. As expeted, the probability p of dis-
ontent agents hanging their strategies plays
the role of dening the onvergene time sale
only[28℄, as in the long run Fc onverges to
a stable value irrespetive of p. This is de-
pited in Fig. 3, whih shows Fc as funtion
of time for several values of p and two dier-
ent values of the temptation r. In these runs,
we have used the Moore neighborhood, i.e.
n = 8. In all the studied ases, Fc turns out
to onverge quite rapidly to a onstant value,
Fc ∼ 0.7 for r = 0.2 and Fc ∼ 0.3 for r = 0.8.
It should be noted that Fc does not have
to onverge to exatly the same stable value
for the same r; even if the game is onsid-
ered to be in equilibrium, there an be some
variane in Fc, whih is also visible in Fig. 3.
However, the value of Fc was found to even-
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Figure 3: Dynamis of the fration of ooper-
ators Fc. The upper urves that onverge to
Fc ∼ 0.7 are for r = 0.2, and the lower urves
that onverge to Fc ∼ 0.3 are for r = 0.8. In
both ases the probability of being disontent is
varied as p = 1, 0.1, 0.01, 0.001 from left to right,
and the lattie size is m = 100x100.
tually remain stable during individual runs,
i.e. no osillations were deteted.
Next, we have studied the average equi-
librium fration of ooperators 〈Fc〉 in the
agent population as funtion of the tempta-
tion parameter r. We let the simulations run
for 500 rounds (with p = 0.1), and averaged
the fration of ooperators for the subsequent
500 rounds. In all ases, the fration had al-
ready onverged before the averaging rounds.
Fig. (4) shows the results for the von Neu-
mann neighborhood (n = 4), illustrated as
the squares. The dotted lines indiate the
upper and lower limits of Eq. (11), and the
dashed diagonal line is Fc = 1 − r, orre-
sponding to the fration of ooperators in the
fully mixed ase [4, 12, 19℄. The fration of
ooperators 〈Fc〉 is seen to follow a stepped
urve, with steps orresponding to r = i/n,
where i = 0, . . . , n. This is a natural on-
sequene of Eqs. (5)-(7), where the deision
boundary θ = n(1 − r) an take only dis-
rete values. A similar piture is given for
the Moore neighborhood (n = 8) in the mid-
dle panel of Fig. (5). Furthermore, in the
middle panel of Fig. (5) the values of Fc fall
between the limits given in Table II for all r
as shown with solid lines.
In both ases (i.e. with Moore and von
Neumann neighborhoods) ooperation is seen
to persist during the whole range r = [0, 1].
This result diers largely from the Fc(r)-
urves of the spatial snowdrift game with
repliator dynamis [12℄, where the fration
of ooperators vanished at some ritial rc.
Hene, we argue that no onlusions on the
eet of spatiality on the snowdrift game
an be drawn without taking into onsidera-
tion the strategy evolution mehanism; loal
deision-making in a restrited neighborhood
yields results whih are dierent from those
resulting from the evolutionary repliator dy-
namis.
We have also studied the equilibrium lat-
tie ongurations for various values of r.
Fig. (5) depits the entral part of the 100×
100-lattie after 1000 simulation rounds us-
ing the Moore neighborhood and p = 0.1,
with white pixels orresponding to oopera-
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Figure 4: Average fration of ooperators 〈Fc〉
versus the temptation r (squares), simulated on
a 100 × 100 lattie with p = 0.1 using the von
Neumann neighborhood. The values for 〈Fc〉 are
averages over 500 simulation rounds, where the
averaging was started after 500 initial rounds to
guarantee onvergene. The dotted lines depit
the upper and lower limits for Fc of Eq. (11).
The dashed diagonal line is 1− r.
tors and blak pixels to defetors. The values
of r have been seleted so that the equilib-
rium situation orresponds to eah plateau
of 〈Fc〉 illustrated in the entral panel.
The observed ongurations are rather
polymorphi, and repeating elementary pat-
terns like those in Fig. (2) are not seen. This
reets the fat that the loal equilibrium
onditions an be satised by various on-
gurations; the random initial onguration
and the asynhronous update then lead to
irregular-looking equilibrium patterns, whih
vary between simulation runs. The patterns
seem to be most irregular when r is around
0.5; this is beause then the equilibrium num-
bers of ooperators and defetors are lose
to eah other, and the ways to assign strate-
gies within loal neighborhoods are most nu-
merous. To be more exat, there are
(
8
i
)
ways to distribute i ooperators in the 8-
neighborhood, and if e.g. 3/8 < r < 4/8,
i is at least 4 and at most 5, maximizing the
value of the binomial oeient. Hene, the
ways of lling the lattie with these neigh-
borhoods in suh a way that the equilibrium
onditions are satised everywhere are most
numerous as well.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
We have presented a variant of the two-
dimensional snowdrift game, where the strat-
egy evolution is determined by agent dei-
sions based on the strategies of other players
within its loal neighborhood. We have ana-
lyzed the lower and upper bounds for equi-
librium ooperator densities with a mean-
eld approah as well as onsidering pos-
sible lattie-lling elementary onguration
bloks. We have also shown with simulations
that this game onverges to equilibrium on-
gurations with onstant ooperator density
depending on the payo parameters, and that
these densities fall within the derived limits.
Furthermore, the strategy ongurations in
the equilibrium state display interesting pat-
terns, espeially for intermediate temptation
parameter values.
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Figure 5: Example equilibrium ongurations of defetors and ooperators on a m = 100 × 100
lattie for various values of r when the Moore neighborhood is used. The ongurations were
reorded after T = 1000 simulation rounds. Only the middle part of the lattie is shown for the
sake of larity. The middle panel depits the average fration of ooperators 〈Fc〉 in the whole
population as a funtion of the temptation r (squares), together with the upper and lower limits
of Eq. (11) (dotted lines) and the limits of Table II (solid lines). The values of 〈Fc〉 are averages
over the last 500 simulation rounds and the dashed diagonal line is Fc = 1 − r, orresponding to
the fration of ooperators in the fully mixed ase [4, 12, 19℄.
Most interestingly, the equilibrium oop-
erator densities dier largely from those re-
sulting from applying the repliator dynam-
is [12℄. With our strategy evolution rules,
ooperation persists through the whole temp-
tation parameter range. This illustrates that
one annot draw general onlusions on the
eet of spatiality on the snowdrift game
without taking the strategy evolution meh-
anisms into onsideration  this should, in
priniple, apply for other spatial games as
well. Care should espeially be taken when
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interpreting the results of investigations on
suh games: the utilized strategy evolution
mehanism should reet the system under
study. We argue that espeially when mod-
eling soial or eonomi systems, there is no
a priori reason to assume that generalized
onlusions an be drawn based on results us-
ing the evolution inspired repliator dynam-
is approah, where high-payo strategies get
opied and breed in proportion to their t-
ness. As we have shown here, loal deision-
making with limited information (neighbor
strategies are known payos are not) an re-
sult in dierent outome.
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